Substitutes or complements? The relationship between the donation of money and time: Disaggregated analysis. by 구자현
 
 
저 시-비 리- 경 지 2.0 한민  
는 아래  조건  르는 경 에 한하여 게 
l  저 물  복제, 포, 전송, 전시, 공연  송할 수 습니다.  
다 과 같  조건  라야 합니다: 
l 하는,  저 물  나 포  경 ,  저 물에 적 된 허락조건
 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.  
l 저 터  허가를 면 러한 조건들  적 되지 않습니다.  
저 에 른  리는  내 에 하여 향  지 않습니다. 




저 시. 하는 원저 를 시하여야 합니다. 
비 리. 하는  저 물  리 목적  할 수 없습니다. 
경 지. 하는  저 물  개 , 형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다. 
경제학석사학위논문 
 
Substitutes or complements?  
The relationship between the donation of money and time: 


















경제학부 경제학 전공 
구자현 
  
Substitutes or complements?  
The relationship between the donation of money and time: 
Disaggregated analysis.  
 
 JAHYEON KOO 
Department of Economics 
The Graduate School  
Seoul National University 
 
This paper analyzes aggregated and disaggregated level of relationship 
between donations of money and time. By using Feldman’s (2010) methodology 
with 2011 PSID data, the aggregated result shows that two altruistic behaviors are 
substitutes. However, in the disaggregated level, in secular industry and religious 
industry, this paper finds a different relationship: While donations of time and 
money are substitutes for secular organizations, they are neither substitutes nor 
complements for religious organizations. This paper also finds that there is positive 
effect of price of monetary donation on volunteering which occurs outside the 
change of relative price. Since this effect is larger than the negative effect of 
relative price across aggregated level and disaggregated level, previous literature 
interpreted their coefficient of tax price on volunteering as complementary 
relationship.  
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Charitable giving consists of huge part of the US GDP; 2 percent of GDP, and 
approximately $373.25 billion in 2015. This is more than 6 times as big as 60 years 
earlier. This large amount of money came mainly from individuals, taking up 73 
percent of the donation. Even considering participation rate, the number remained 
large: 67 percent of the entire households in the US donated in 2014.
1
 Volunteering 
is another part of people’s altruistic behaviors and as popular as charitable giving. 
According to the Bureau of Labor statistics, 45 percent of US citizens volunteered 
in 2014 and their average hours are 233 hours per year: Recalculating this into total 
time volunteered in the US, it is 8.1 billion hours.
2
 These large amounts of money 
and time, and high participation rate have attracted many scholars to research about 
the supply of philanthropic behaviors and how individuals decide on which way of 
charitable contribution to choose.  
The US government started to intervene in the supply of altruistic behaviors 
long time ago: they have given tax benefits such as deduction to money-donators 
since 1917. Because of popularity among US people and long history of 
intervention, many economists have researched about monetary donation, and 
predicted the effect of the government policies; calculating tax-price elasticity of 
monetary donation. However, some researchers found out that tax policies is not 
only related to donation of money, but also related to donation of time: Brown and 
Lankford (1992) argued that previous literature under-stated the policy effect 
because they ignored interdependence between two altruistic behaviors. Feldman 
(2010) even showed existence of direct effect of price of monetary donation on 
volunteering in addition to the indirect relationship.  
In addition, some researchers have expected that even all other extrinsic things 
being equal, individual donates their money and time differently across types of a 
charity: since charities differ in the bundle of opportunities they make available to 
volunteers, the supply of volunteer is different across industries even if volunteers 
have an identical preference. Heterogeneous preference among people is another 
                                           
1 Philanthropy-round-table Statistics on U.S. Generosity. 
http://www.philanthropyroundtable.org/almanac/statistics/ 
2 Bureau of Labor Statistics U.S. Department of Labor. 2015. Volunteering in the 
Unities States – 2014.  
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reason to expect the supply differs. (Segal and Weisbrod. 2002) Regarding 
donation of money, in order to meet different level of altruism and any other 
feelings such as religiosity, people donate more money for some charities and less 
for the others. Therefore, these imply that various demographic, financial and other 
factors are associated with monetary donation and volunteering differently, 
including direct and indirect effects of price of monetary donation. 
Putting together, to understand the relationship between two popular altruistic 
behaviors and predict effects of government policies better, we need to estimate 
and distinguish between direct and indirect effect of the price of monetary donation 
in the disaggregated level. There is presumption in the previous literature that 
religious giving is somehow different than other forms of giving (Andreoni et al. 
1996) and American spend much time for religiosity, which is the a critical 
determinant of well-being. (Iannaccone, 1998. Gruber, 2004.) Moreover, 
individuals allocate their time and goods for religious organizations to maximize 
afterlife utility. (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975) These are the reasons why this paper 
analyzes two altruistic behaviors, separating into religious charities and non-
religious charities. Many papers have found that economic factors such as income 
and price are less correlated to religious activities than non-religious activities. This 
paper also finds similar pattern in tax-price, income.  
DiNardo and Lemieux (1992, 2001) made a nice structural model to find this 
relationship and Feldman (2010) used this for the aggregated-level analysis of 
charitable activities. I modify utility function by substituting summation of utility 
of altruistic behaviors in each organization for utility of the behaviors in aggregated 
level.  
The rest of this paper is following: Chapter 2 reviews previous literature about 
the relationship between two altruistic behaviors. Chapter 3 introduces a simple 
theory about monetary donation and volunteering, and Chapter 4 explains 
empirical methodology this paper uses. Chapter 5 talks about data, and in Chapter 
6, I present and interpret the result. Chapter 7 visualizes the result by simulating the 
policy change. Chapter 8 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
As a basic tool to study donation of money and time, many economists have 
used tax-price as price of monetary donations. Especially, in the United States, 
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monetary donation is tax-deductible, so if donators itemize, they can get some 
federal tax discounts. Thus, economists define price of monetary donation as 
𝑝𝑐 = 1 − 𝜏 where 𝜏 is marginal federal and state tax rate. In other words, a 
donator pays 1 − 𝜏 dollar for one-dollar monetary donation good. On the other 
hand, there has been a dispute about the price of volunteering, such as wage and 
working hours. (Bauer et al. 2012) 
With tax price, while there have been a lot of papers studying about monetary 
donation, there have been few studies about volunteer activities. Regarding 
volunteering, some tried to find the relationship with donation of money by adding 
the price of donation as independent variables. Dye (1980) used linear probability 
model in which a binary indicator for volunteering is regressed on individual 
characteristics and tax price. According to him, estimated cross-price elasticity is -
0.136, interpreting two altruistic behaviors are complements. Menchik and 
Weisbrod (1986) used multivariate tobit model to find out which model is right; the 
consumption model versus the investment model. Their result was in line with the 
investment model. And, with the significantly negative coefficient of tax price in 
time equation, they also concluded that donations of time and money are 
complements. Freeman (1997) found out that among time-and-money-donators as 
wage or incomes increases, people tends to substitutes monetary donation for 
volunteering, which indicates they are substitutes as wage is considered as price of 
volunteering. According to his paper, although the pattern of volunteering 
participation seems different from substitutionary relationship, this is because those 
donating money are more frequently asked to volunteer. Segal and Weisbrod (2002) 
used tobit model where hours of volunteering individual spent are a dependent 
variable. However, they did not researched in aggregated level, but disaggregated 
level across industries: Their idea was that like individual gets different level of 
utility when they do different volunteer activities, they feel different level of utility 
across industries. Their result confirmed that not only various factors are 
differently associated with volunteering, depending on types of organizations, but 
also the relationship between donations of time and money are different; 
complements in education industry, substitutes in religious industry, and neither 
complements nor substitutes in health industry.  
The first paper studying donation of money and time jointly was Brown and 
Lankford (1992). Their motivation is that because of interdependence between 
those, the effect of government tax policy may be under- or over-stated by 
considering monetary donation alone. By using bivariate tobit regression on 
donation money and time they found complementary relationship, which suggests 
the effect of policy on philanthropy is understated. Another paper looking at those 
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is Duncan (1999): He developed a public good theory extending volunteering and 
donating
3
, predicting that two behaviors are perfectly substitutable in equilibrium 
and individual cares about total supply of public good. His empirical result casted a 
doubt that individual receives ‘warm-glow’ utility derived from gifts of time and 
money separately.
4
 Thus, he argued that although cross-price elasticity for 
volunteering is negative, this does not mean that donation of money and time are 
complements. To sum up his paper, he did not find direct evidence of substitutes, 
but he found empirical evidence consistent with the substitutionary relationship. 
Andreoni et al. (1996) was first to use utility maximizing model with bivariate tobit 
model. Although they found the small negative cross-price elasticity, supporting 
gross complementary relationship
5
, they did not allow the direct effect of tax-price 
of on volunteering: they only considered the effect derived by the change of 
relative price.  
Unlike Andreoni et al. (1996), Feldman (2010) distinguished between three 
effects of price of monetary donation; the own price effect on monetary donation, 
the substitution effect by the change of relative price, and finally the non-
substitution effect on volunteering by the direct impact of tax-price. She showed 
that they are actually substitutes and the final effect exists, explaining possible 
sources of the effect. She also mentioned that the reason why the past studies 
concluded complementary relationship between those is that the coefficient of tax 
price in their time equation reflects two confounded effects; the substitution effect 
and non-substitution effect that work outside of change of the relative price. If non-
substitution effect is larger than the substation effect, this makes two behaviors 
seem complements. Although her analysis is not quantities of donations of time and 
money but participation or not, it is meaningful that her methodology can clearly 
show their relationship.  
Bauer et al. (2012) used the disaggregated data in European countries. Because 
                                           
3 Bergstrom et al. (1986) developed a public good theory about monetary 
contribution, and Andreoni (1990) extended this theory, adding impure altruism, in 
other words, warm-glow.  
4 With this finding, he argued that tax-price, which is used for the price of donation, is 
price of total value of charitable giving, not the price of monetary donation. 
5 However, using Hicksian demand, they estimated positive cross-price elasticity, 
which suggests monetary donation and volunteering is substitutes.  
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the data does not have tax, they used working hours as the price of volunteering. In 
the aggregated level, they found the lowest probability of donating money for those 
who are not employed (who does not spend any hour for working) and the highest 
probability of donating money for those working more than 45 hours, concluding 
that time and money donations are substitutes. In the disaggregated level, they 
found this substitutionary relationship in social and leisure activity organizations. 
However, the problem is that this result can be derived from differences in 
unobservable variables between non-employed individuals and those working 
exceedingly long hours. Moreover, even if this could be concluded as the 
substitutionary relationship, this pattern does not appear clearly.  
 
3. Theoretical background 
 
Here, I use Feldman’s (2010) model which was originally from DiNardo and 
Lemieux (1992, 2001) based on private consumption model with a little 
modification. Individual prefers more consumption good, 𝑥, leisure, 𝑙, donation of 
money and time for each organization, 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖. This is represented by  
𝑈(𝑥 𝑙, 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) = 𝑢1(𝑥) + 𝑢2(𝑙) + ∑ ∅𝑖(𝑐𝑖, 𝑣𝑖)
𝑖=𝑟,𝑛
 
where 𝑈  is increasing in each of its argument, quasi-concave, and twice 
continuously differentiable. What is different from Feldman (2010) is that this 
paper segments utility of altruistic behaviors on the basis of organization types. On 
the functional form, it is ∑ ∅𝑖(𝑐𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖)𝑖=𝑟,𝑛  rather than ∅(𝑐, 𝑣) . ∅𝑖(𝑐𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖)  is 
additionally assumed to be quadratic in 𝑐𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑖 as a local approximation to an 
arbitrary utility function, which is  









where 𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖 indicates whether donation of time and money are Frisch complements 
(𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖 > 0), Frisch substitutes (𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖 < 0), or separable (𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖 = 0).
6
 Note that the 
                                           
6 See Appendix about Frisch complements and substitutes in this model. For more detail 
about Frisch demand, refer to Browning et al. (1985).  
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above utility function internally assumes that decision on monetary donation and 
volunteering for religious organizations is separable from those for non-religious 
organizations.  
Assume 𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖  and 𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖  are negative, which means the marginal utility 
decreases as individual donates more. The maximization problem is 
𝑈(𝑥 𝑙, 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) s. t. 
 𝑥+∑ 𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖=𝑟,𝑛 < y 
𝑙 + ∑ 𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑖 < 𝑇
𝑖=𝑟,𝑛
 
𝑐𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑣𝑖 ≥ 0 
where y, 𝑇 indicate individual’s total income and non-labor hours and 𝑝𝑐 , 𝑝𝑣 are 
price of donation of money and time. 
The first order conditions of the above are 
𝑥:  𝑢1
′ − 𝜆𝑐 = 0 
𝑙:  𝑢2
′ − 𝜆𝑣 = 0 
𝑐𝑖: 𝑟𝑐𝑖 + 𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑖 + 𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐 + 𝜉𝑐𝑖 = 0 
𝑣𝑖: 𝑟𝑣𝑖 + 𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑖 +  𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣 + 𝜉𝑣𝑖 = 0 
where𝜆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜉𝑖𝑗  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 𝑟, 𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖= 𝑐, 𝑣 are Lagrange multiplier. Complementary 
slackness adds  
𝜉𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑖 = 0 and 𝜉𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑖 = 0. 
 Using the above notations, we can make the conditions for donations of 
time and money: Individual donates their money for religious or non-religious 
organizations if the marginal utility minus marginal cost is positive at zero 
donations. Similarly, they volunteer if the difference is positive at zero volunteering. 




- Outcome 1 (Neither) 
𝑟𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣 < 0 
- Outcome 2 (Only donating money)  
𝑟𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣 − (
𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖
) (𝑟𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐) < 0 
- Outcome 3 (Only volunteering) 
𝑟𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐 − (
𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
 𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖
) (𝑟𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣) < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑟𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣 > 0 
- Outcome 4 (Both donating money and volunteering)  
𝑟𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐 − (
𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
 𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖
) (𝑟𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣) > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑟𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣 − (
𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖
) (𝑟𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐) > 0 
 
Specifically, Outcome 1 can be gotten this way: according to the first order 
condition of 𝑐𝑖, when individual does not give money to charities, 𝑟𝑐𝑖 + 𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖 ∙ 0 +
𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖 ∙ 0 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐 + 𝜉𝑐𝑖 . And if this is optimal, 𝑟𝑐𝑖 + 𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖 ∙ 0 + 𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖 ∙ 0 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐 + 𝜉𝑐𝑖 = 0. 
Note that by complementary slackness, 𝜉𝑐𝑖 > 0. Thus, 𝑟𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐 < 0. You can get 
𝑟𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣 < 0  with the similar way. To get outcome 2, the condition of 
𝑟𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣 is opposite to Outcome 1 since the first of condition is 𝑟𝑐𝑖 + 𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖 ∙ 0 +
𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐 =0 where 𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖 is assumed to be negative. However, the condition of 








 ) + 𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖 ∙ 0 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣 + 𝜉𝑣𝑖 = 0 . After rearranging, 
𝑟𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐 − (
𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖
) (𝑟𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣) < 0. Outcome 3 and 4 can be gotten similarly.  
Simply, the above condition can be written as 
 𝐼𝑐𝑖 = 1 ↔ 𝑇𝑐𝑖 − 𝐼𝑣𝑖 (
𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
 𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖
)𝑇𝑣𝑖 > 0 
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𝐼𝑣𝑖 = 1 ↔ 𝑇𝑣𝑖 − 𝐼𝑐𝑖 (
𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
 𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖
)𝑇𝑐𝑖 > 0 
where 𝑇𝑐𝑖 ≡ 𝛾𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐  and 𝑇𝑣𝑖 ≡ 𝛾𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣 . Intuitively when one decides to 
donate money, this decision influences on the process of decision on volunteering. 
Figure 1 describes how thresholds changes when donation of money and time are 
substitutes and complements respectively. If one’s 𝑇𝑐𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑣𝑖 are located over 
CAE and on the right of BAD, he is willing to donate money and time. As seen the 
Figure 1, if donation of money and time are substitutes threshold of money and 
time increase as the other threshold increases and if complements, vice versa: In 
the case of substitutes, those who volunteer require more satisfaction in order to 
start donating money than those who do not volunteer. 
 
Figure 1: Threshold of time and money  
when they are substitutes and complements. 
 
Assuming tax-price does not impact on 𝑇𝑣𝑖 , if two behaviors are 
substitutes, then increase of tax price will increase 𝑇𝑣𝑖 − 𝐼𝑐𝑖 (
𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖
)𝑇𝑐𝑖 by reducing 
𝑇𝑐𝑖. (Since 𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖 is assumed to be negative, 
𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖
 is positive if they are substitutes.) 
Here, 𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖 captures extrinsic motivations by the change of relative price.  
 However, assuming tax-price does not impact on 𝑇𝑣𝑖 is too restrictive. 
For example, as Feldman (2010) points out that governmental subsidization of 
monetary contribution may increase the utility for time donations, since this 
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subsidization can play a role like campaign for charitable giving. Moreover, the 
subsidization is more likely to motivate more people to donate money, and this 
increased participation can reduce the cost of volunteer activities. How? When 
donating money for an organization, they can get information on this organization 
and are more likely to be asked to participate in donating time. Freeman (1997) 
called these effects “tastes” for charitable giving. He claimed that these tastes must 
outweigh the substitution effect. This paper will check out finding is in line with 
his argument.    
 
4. Econometric specification 
 
For econometric specification, consider the assumption (A1) 𝛾𝑐𝑖 and 𝛾𝑣𝑖 are 
stochastically distributed across people. Then, it can be written as  
(A1)       𝛾𝑐𝑖 = 𝑋𝛽𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑐𝑖 
𝛾𝑣𝑖 = 𝑋𝛽𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑣𝑖 
where 𝑋 is a vector of individual characteristics and  






This indicates that unobservable variables of giving of time and money may be 
correlated. And, consider another assumption that marginal utility of income is 
function of income.  
(A2)      𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐 ≈ 𝛼0𝑐 + 𝛼𝑦𝑐𝑦 + 𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑐 
 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣 ≈ 𝛼0𝑣 + 𝛼𝑦𝑣𝑦 + 𝛼𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑐 
Since money that individual spends for donation is about 2% among total 
consumption and time for volunteering is relatively small, this assumption that the 
marginal utility of income and time is only influenced by income is reasonable. 
(Feldman, 2010) Then, 𝑇𝑐𝑖 ≡ 𝛾𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐 and 𝑇𝑣𝑖 ≡ 𝛾𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣 can be written as  
(A3)   𝑇𝑐𝑖 ≡ 𝑍𝜂𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑐𝑖 
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 𝑇𝑣𝑖 ≡ 𝑍𝜂𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑣𝑖. 
where Z includes tax price, income and individual characteristics. If the 
assumptions of 𝛾𝑐𝑖, 𝛾𝑣𝑖, 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐, and 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣 were right, this model could have been 
identified by achieving exclusion restrictions
7
 and on the basis of functional form. 
However, since 𝑝𝑐 can somehow influence on  𝑇𝑣𝑖 and so can 𝑝𝑣 on 𝑇𝑐𝑖, so this 
model relies solely on functional form assumption only to identify the parameters 
of interest of the model. It is another reason to rely on the assumption that there 
exists the argument over which variable is appropriate for 𝑝𝑣. 
 Using the above notation, the constraints of four outcomes are 
- Outcome 1 (neither donation)  
𝜀𝑐𝑖 < −𝑇𝑐𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜀𝑣𝑖 < −𝑇𝑣𝑖 
- Outcome 2 (money only)  
𝜀𝑐𝑖 > −𝑇𝑐𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜀𝑣𝑖 − (
𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
 𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖








) ∙ 𝜀𝑣𝑖 < −𝑇𝑐𝑖 + (
𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
 𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖
)𝑇𝑣𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜀𝑣𝑖 > −𝑇𝑣𝑖 




) ∙ 𝜀𝑣𝑖 > −𝑇𝑐𝑖 + (
𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖
)𝑇𝑣𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜀𝑣𝑖 − (
𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖




 To estimate coefficients, it needs to construct log-likelihood function and 
use Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Since this model uses marginal utility and 
marginal cost, which are latent variables, this model can be estimated up to a scale. 
The log likelihood function after scaling is  
                                           
7 Since 𝐼𝑣𝑖  and 𝐼𝑐𝑖  are endogenous variables by simultaneity, using 𝑝𝑐 as instrument 
for 𝐼𝑐𝑖  and 𝑝𝑣 as that for 𝐼𝑣𝑖 
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𝐿𝑖=𝑟,𝑛 =∑𝐼𝑗∈𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛷 (−𝑡𝑣𝑗𝑖 ,  − 𝑡𝑐𝑗𝑖;  𝜌𝑖 )
𝑁
𝑗=1




  (−𝜌𝑖 + 𝜑𝑣𝑖)
𝑠𝑣𝑖
) 














[𝜌𝑖(1 + 𝜑𝑣𝑖𝜑𝑐𝑖) − (𝜑𝑣𝑖+𝜑𝑐𝑖)]
𝑠𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑖
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= 1 + 𝜑𝑐𝑖
2
− 2𝜌𝑖𝜑𝑐𝑖 , 𝑠𝑣𝑖
2
= 1 + 𝜑𝑣𝑖
2














, 𝜑𝑐𝑖 , 𝜑𝑣𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖 can be estimated. If monetary donation and 
volunteering are substitutes, 𝜑𝑐𝑖 and 𝜑𝑣𝑖 are positive because 𝛾𝑣𝑣𝑖 and 𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑖 are 
assumed to be negative (Concavity Assumption).  
 
5. Data  
 
This paper uses PSID (The US Panel Study of Income Dynamics), which was 
conducted every two years from 1968 with a nationally representative sample of 
over 18,000 individuals living in 5,000 families. The Center on Philanthropy Panel 
Study conducted the survey with PSID to get data of charitable giving and 
volunteer activities from 2001 to 2011. However, due to insufficient fund, they did 
not survey about volunteer activities in 2005, 2007, 2009. Thus, I use data in 2011. 
The number of families participating in the survey is 8,907, and after excluding 
missing data for variables this paper uses, the number becomes 4,421.  
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There are some advantages for using PSID rather than Giving and 
Volunteering used by Feldman (2010). First, The Data of Giving and Volunteering 
has insufficient data to analyze in organization types specifically in 1996. They 
asked participants’ volunteering in each type, but it has a large amount of missing 
data, and the number of participants answering all question is very small. On the 
other hand, the number of participants answering all volunteering questions is 
5,457. And excluding missing data for other independent variables, the number, 
4,421, is still enough to analyze empirically. Second, PSID has more appropriate 
data to calculate tax-price for donation of money and after-tax income than Giving 
and Volunteering. TAXSIM program is widely used to calculate tax-price and 
income.
8
 (Feenberg and Elizabeth Coutts, 1993) Giving and Volunteering does not 
have data like pensions, gross social security income, and investment income, 
which are inputs of TAXSIM program, but PSID has. Thus, PSID can calculate 
more precisely these variables. Moreover, many researchers developed a method to 
use TAXSIM program with PSID data. (Butrica and Burkhauser, 1997 ; Kimberlin 
et al., 2015) so, this is another benefit by using PSID. 
However, calculating and using tax price directly with the actual amount of 
individual’s monetary donation for an independent variable can cause endogeneity 
since a donator contribute more, tax price gets higher. Feldman (2010) and Yoruk 
(2011) solved this problem by calculating tax-price assuming zero monetary 
contribution. Similarly I calculate after tax income.
9
 
The other variables, financial and socio-demographic factors, are frequently 
used when analyzing individuals’ charitable behaviors. Table 1 is summary of 
statistics of dependent data, whether they donated or not and whether volunteering 
or not for any organizations, for religious organizations, and for non-religious 
organizations, and Table 2 is about independent variables. Since this paper only 
                                           
8 Appendix A2 and Table A1 gives the calculation of TAXSIM program for a sample 
entry. 
9 There is the other issue on calculating tax-price assuming zero monetary 
contribution, borderline itemizer. Borderline itemizer is a household that would no 
longer itemize in the case of zero monetary charitable contributions. In other words, it 
is a household whose monetary donation is a critical factor to itemize or not. 
According to Feldman (2010), less than 3 percent of itemizers are borderline itemizers, 
so it is reasonable to consider tax-price as fairly exogenous to charitable giving.  
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uses data from head of household
10
, the proportion of male is higher than other 
studies.
 
The reason why using only head’s data is that they are mainly responsible 
for financial matters. For example, some wives do not donate money just because 
their heads donate. Including this kind of data makes it difficult to find factors 
influencing altruistic behaviors and the relationship between those. Thus, this paper 
excludes data from wives and other members of households.  
Table 1. Money and Time Contributions for Charity in 2010. 
 
Aggregate  Time 
 
 
No Yes Total 
Money No 1,000 364 1,364 
 Yes 1,590 1,467 3,057 
 Total 2,590  1,831 4,421 
 
Religious  Time 
 
 
No Yes Total 
Money No 2,299 109 2,408 
 Yes 1,290 723 2,013 
 Total 3,580 832 4,421 
 
Secular  Time 
 
 
No Yes Total 
Money No 1,395 475 1,870 
 Yes 1,445 1,106 2,551 
 Total 2,840 1,581 4,421 
 
                                           
10 For example, Brown et al only used data from heads. (2012)  
14 
 
Table 2. Summary of Statistics of Independent Variables in 2010. 
Variable Description Mean  Std. Dev. 
Taxprice 
Equal to 1 − τ where τ is the marginal rate 




After-tax household income. Equal to income 
minus federal and state taxes where taxes are 
calculated assuming zero monetary contribution 
4.690 5.560 
Age(10) Age of respondent. 4.535 1.547 
Children Number of children under 18 in household. 0.894 1.181 
Child in college 
Equal to one if the respondent is a college 
graduate, zero otherwise. 
0.890 1.125 
Married Equal to one if married, zero otherwise.  0.708 0.455 
Religious 
Equal to zero if the respondent never attends a 
religious service,  one if attending once a year, 
two if attending once every month, three if the 
attending once every two weeks, four if attending 
once every week, five if attending once everyday 
1.765 1.599 
College grad. 
Equal to one if the respondent is a college 
graduate, zero otherwise. 
0.551 0.497 
Max. educ. 
Equal to one if at least one member of the 
household is a college graduate, zero otherwise. 
0.696 0.460 
Homeowner 




0 if the both respondent’s parents had no 
education, 1 if the at least one of respondent’s 
parents completed 0-5 grades, 
2 if 6-8 grades, 3 if 9-11 grades, 4 if 12 grades, 5 
if 12 grades plus nonacademic training, 6 if non-
degree in some college, 7 if B.A in college, 8 if 
graduate degree in college 
4.600 2.282 
Employed 
Equal to one if the respondent is employed full 
time, zero otherwise. 
0.674 0.469 
Minority 
Equal to one if the respondent identities as a 




Equal to one if the respondent identities as 
Hispanic, zero otherwise. 
0.085 0.279 
Male 








1) Result of probit and bivariate probit model 
 
Column 1 and 2 in table 3 is the results of the aggregated level in the following 
probit, bivariate probit model:  
𝐼𝑐𝑖 = 1 ↔ 𝑍𝜂𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑐𝑖 > 0 
𝐼𝑣𝑖 = 1 ↔ 𝑍𝜂𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑣𝑖 > 0 
where 𝛾𝑐𝑣𝑖 is constrained to equal zero in both models and 𝜌𝑖 is constrained to 
zero in probit model.  
Our main interest, tax price is negatively correlated to the money donation in 
column 1 and 2. At the mean of each independent variable, 10% increase of tax 
price reduces the probability of money donation by 5 percent (p-value of 0.00) in 
probit regression. Considering the time donation, in both probit models, tax price is 
negatively correlated to the probability, which tempts researchers to interpret that 
the relationship of time and money donation is complementary. As tax price goes 
up by 10%, the probability of donating time decreases by 0.02 at the mean in probit 
model. (p-value of 0.00) With respect to income, as income goes up, the probability 
of donating money increases, but the marginal effect of an additional income 
decreases. This pattern appears similarly in time equation. At the mean, increase of 
income $10,000 is associated with increase in probability of donating money by 
0.02 and of donating time by 0.01. The positive coefficient of income in money 
equation supports that monetary donation is a normal good. Regarding 
volunteering, since the shadow value of time should increase as income increases, 
donation of time should fall. At the same time, there may be opposite forces. For 
example, if volunteering is a normal good, demand for it should increases as 
income rises. Or, income may represent social status, which can be another force 
that makes the coefficient of income positive. (Feldman, 2010) Here, like 
Feldman’s result, the positive coefficient of income shows that the latter force is 
stronger than the former force. 
Table 4 and 5 is the result of time and money donation for religious and non-
religious organizations in probit, bivariate probit, and full structural model. Segal 
and Weisbrod (2002) argued that considering volunteer labor a homogeneous 
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activity may make a wrong conclusion. Moreover, Bauer et al. (2012) found a 
similar result that all parameters across the four types of organizations for donating 
time and money (social organization, leisure activity, work-related and political 
organizations, religious organizations) are rejected. Our result shows that in probit 
and bivariate probit model, the hypothesis all parameters including constant are 
equal between religious and non-religious giving is rejected.
11
 
For religious organizations, tax price is negatively correlated with probability 
of giving money and time in both probit models significantly. At the mean, increase 
in tax-price by 10% leads to decreasing the probability of monetary giving by 4 
percent and the probability of volunteering by 1.5 percent. For non-religious 
organizations, tax price is negatively correlated to money and time equation. If the 
price increases by 10%, the probability of money decreases by 5% and that of time 
goes down by 1.5% respectively in column 1. 
With respect to income, for religious organizations, the coefficient in money 
and time equation is positive but is not significant anymore. In money equation, 
homeowner is more likely to donate, so this means that the stability of income 
matters and monetary donation is still a normal good. Nonetheless, in time equation, 
neither income and nor owning home is significantly positive. Borrowing the 
explanation from Feldman (2010), the positive force of income effect such as social 
status is not larger than the shadow price effect. For non-religious organizations, 
the coefficient of income in money and time equation is similar to the aggregated 
result.  
Correlation gives information on unobservable variables related to the 
altruistic behaviors to us. Column 2 in table 3, 4 and 5 shows significantly positive 
correlation in the aggregated level and regardless of the type of organizations. Thus, 
positive correlation implies that the unobservable variables such as altruism 
determine both behaviors.  
The most important thing we find in both probit models is that regardless of 
the type of organization, donation of time and money seems complement. 
 
                                           
11 Rejection is based on Chi-square test statistics with 21 degrees of freedom of 
2099.46, and 1286.68 for money and time equations, respectively in probit model. In 
bivariate probit model, 1967.7 and 1287,26 for money and time equations respectively.  
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Money    
Taxprice -1.664*** -1.683*** -1.670*** 
 (0.203) (0.202) (0.202) 
Income($0000) 0.0691*** 0.0659*** 0.0676*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0144) 
Income_sq -0.000543*** -0.000513*** -0.000540*** 
 (0.000113) (0.000118) (0.000111) 
Constant -1.487*** -1.490*** -0.0303 





-1,982.6479   
Taxprice -0.429*** -0.442*** -1.022*** 
 (0.138) (0.138) (0.337) 
Income($0000) 0.0148* 0.0152* 0.0414*** 
 (0.00886) (0.00906) (0.0154) 
Income_sq -0.000196** -0.000201** -0.000381*** 
 (9.20e-05) (9.39e-05) (0.000124) 























































Money    
Taxprice -0.996*** -0.995*** -1.018*** 
 (0.199) (0.193) (0.192) 
Income($0000) 0.00541 0.00593 0.00579 
 (0.00951) (0.00986) (0.00967) 
Income_sq 0.000115 0.000120 0.000118 
 (0.000147) (0.000163) (0.000156) 









Taxprice -0.823*** -0.761*** -0.795*** 
 (0.152) (0.154) (0.282) 
Income($0000) -0.00671 -0.00920 -0.00752 
 (0.0111) (0.0120) (0.0132) 
Income_sq -3.48e-06 2.89e-05 5.18e-05 




































































 (0.145) (0.147) (0.137) 
Income($0000) 0.0687*** 0.0672*** 0.0676*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0113) 
Income_sq -0.000515*** -0.000502*** -0.000512*** 
 (9.14e-05) (9.19e-05) (8.84e-05) 








Taxprice -0.404*** -0.418*** -0.758*** 
 (0.122) (0.121) (0.208) 
Income($0000) 0.0160* 0.0163** 0.0365** 
 (0.00833) (0.00831) (0.0156) 
Income_sq -0.000179** -0.000182** -0.000314*** 

















































2) Result of full structural model 
 
Probit and bivariate probit model assume that charitable giving and voluntary 
activities are separable (𝛾𝑐𝑣𝑖 = 0) in consumption. Nonetheless, many studies 
argue that they are complements (Brown and Lankford, 1992) or substitutes (Segal 
and Weisbrod, 2002) in some types of charities. If their interpretations were right in 
Frisch sense, the effect of tax price on volunteering outside of the effect of relative 
price should not have existed. Thus, whether using probit and bivariate probit 
model is appropriate or not depends on this existence. However as later we will 
check, the direct effect of tax price on volunteering exists. As DiNardo and 
Lemieux (1992, 2001) and Feldman (2010) did, I use full structural model to find 
out the relationship, assuming the marginal utility of time affects that of money and 
vice versa. Like probit and bivariate probit model, the hypothesis all parameters 




𝜑𝑣 and 𝜑𝑐 in column 3 in table 3 support that they are substitutes. To argue 
they are substitutes, what we have to focus on is not only 𝜑𝑣 and 𝜑𝑐 , but also the 
difference of the coefficient of tax price for time donation in column 2 and 3. This 
is because even though 𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖  is not large enough to express substitutionary or 
complementary effect, small 𝛾𝑣𝑣𝑖 and 𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑖 , which cannot be estimated in this 
model, can make 𝜑𝑣 and 𝜑𝑐 significantly positive. Moreover, the coefficient in 
column 2 reflects two confounding effects, the effect of relative price plus the 
effect that work outside the change of the relative price. Thus, in addition to 𝜑𝑣 
and 𝜑𝑐 , if they are substitutes and the model is well constructed, the coefficient of 
tax price in time equation in bivariate probit model is larger than the coefficient in 
full structural model. When moving from bivariate probit model to the full 
structural model, the coefficient increases over twice in table 3.
13
 As expected, in 
full structural model, the coefficient in the time equation indicates that non-
substitution effect is negatively correlated to time donation and the difference of 
                                           
12 Rejection is based on Chi-square test statistics with 22 degrees of freedom of 
1424.87, and 1139.11 for money and time equations, respectively. 




coefficients indicates the positive substitution effect if the government increases 
the tax price. In column 3, the coefficient of tax price in time equation can be 
considered as “societal approval of charitable giving” or Freeman’s claim, “tastes 
for charitable giving” made by decrease of the price of donating money. Here, as 
Freeman (1997) argued, these tastes outweigh the substitution effect. 
Like probit and bivariate probit model, I analyze two behaviors, dividing 
by two sectors, religious and non-religious sectors with full structural model, which 
appears in table 4 and 5. In religious sector, interestingly, after distinguishing the 
substitution effect and non-substitution effect, the coefficient of tax price in time 
equation does not change between column 2 and 3. Although 𝜑𝑐 is significantly 
positive and the hypothesis that 𝜑𝑐 and 𝜑𝑣  are equal to zero is rejected, the 
change of the coefficient of tax price in Time equation is not big.
14
 This indicates 
that the substitution effect of the change of relative price does not exist. 
Remembering the form of 𝜑𝑐  and 𝜑𝑣 , 𝜑𝑐  can be large even if 𝛾𝑐𝑣  is small 
because of small 𝛾𝑣𝑣𝑖  and 𝛾𝑐𝑐𝑖 . Thus, the relationship between both giving 
behaviors is not substitutionary for religious organizations. This result is consistent 
with Bauer et al. (2010), which found no relationship, but not line with Segal and 
Weisbrod (2002) who found substitutionary relationship in religious giving. Since 
our result shows that outside-effect on volunteering exists and Segal and Weisbrod 
(2002) used simple tobit model in time equation, in Frisch sense their negative 
coefficient of tax-price in time equation should not be interpreted as the 
substitutionary relationship.    
On the other hand, for non-religious organizations, after distinguishing 
substitution and non-substitution effect, the absolute value of the coefficient of the 
price in Time equation gets almost twice bigger. 
15
Moreover, 𝜑𝑐  and 𝜑𝑣  are 
significantly positive. This pattern is similar to the aggregate result, showing that 
two donation behaviors are substitutes. Segal and Weisbrod (2002) found 
complementary relationship in education sector, but Bauer et al. (2010) found 
substitutionary in social and leisure organizations. Again, since our result shows 
that outside-effect on volunteering exists, and Segal and Weisbrod (2002) used 
simple tobit model in time equation, their positive coefficient of tax-price in time 
                                           
14 The hypothesis that the coefficient of log price in column 2 and 3 are same is cannot 
be rejected by any statistical meaningful level.  
15 The hypothesis that the coefficient of log price in column 2 and 3 are same is 
rejected by 10 percent. 
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equation reflects two confounding effect: the relative price effect plus the direct 
effect of monetary donation price. 
Here after considering substitution effect, correlation is still significantly 
positive in aggregated and disaggregated level. Thus, again, there are unobservable 
variables, internal altruism or something else determining both donations of time 
and money. 
 
7. Policy simulation: Discount the price of donation of money by 10%  
 
As seen the model, discounted tax price in this model does not have same 
effects on all households. Thus, to visualize the effect of tax price on donation of 
money and time, this paper simulates change of tax policy; discounting tax-price 
by 10 percent. Figure 2 indicates the change of proportion of the four outcomes if 
the government discounts the price of donation of money by 10 percent. This 
policy change may be introduction of a universal tax deduction for donations of 
money like Feldman (2010), the increase of dollar deduction for charitable giving, 
and so on.  
Panel A indicates the change by the substitution effects from change of the 
relative price, which is 𝜑𝑐, 𝜑𝑣 or the difference between the coefficient of tax-
price of time equation in column 2 and 3 in the table. As the absolute value of 𝜑𝑐 
and 𝜑𝑣 and the change of coefficient are largest in the aggregate result, change of 
the blue bar is the biggest. Conversely, as expected, change of religious 
organization is very small, which indicates no substitution effect in religious sector. 
Comparing with Feldman (2010), here, the substitution effect is enough to push 
those who only volunteer to donate money in aggregate level and for non-religious 
organizations.  
Panel B shows the effect of non-substitution effects. These effects include the 
effect on money by the change of own price, and other effects rather than 
substitution effect by change of relative price, for example, “societal approval”. In 
other words, using notations in the model, these effects show direct tax-price effect 
on both 𝑇𝑐𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑣𝑖. What is interesting here, as shown in the result, discounted 
price of donating money directly increases 𝑇𝑣𝑖. The proportion of people who 
neither donate money and time decreases and that of those who donate both 
increases, which supports “societal approval”. This change can be because of the 
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campaign effect, augmenting marginal utility of volunteering, or more information 
on charities due to more people donating money, diminishing the cost of 
volunteering. Compared to the substitution effect here, the change in religious 
sector is relatively large. Thus, for non-substitution effect, there is no significant 
difference between religious and non-religious sector.  
Panel C shows the sum of two previous effects. First, in the aggregate, the 
change of tax policy by 10% reduces the proportion of Neither and Time only by 
2.9 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. In contrast, the proportion of Money only 
and both increases by 1.1 percent and 3.3 percent. For religious organizations, that 
of Neither decreases 4.3 percent but here, that of Time only increases by 0.02 
percent which is very small. Like the aggregate, that of Money only and of Both go 
up by 2.8 percent and 1.5 percent. As the next figure shows, this change is almost 
from the non-substitution effect. Finally, the direction and magnitude of change of 
proportion for non-religious sector is similar with the aggregate result. (Decrease in 
Neither and Time only by 4.2 percent and 1 percent, and increase in Money only 
















Figure 2: The change of proportion of outcomes after discounting price by 10% 
Panel A: Substitution effect  
 
Panel B: Own price effect and non-substitution effect  
 
































None     Time only  Money only   Both 
None     Time only   Money only    Both 
None      Time only   Money only  Both 
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Figure 3 analyzes the effects in change of Time and Money. Panel A indicates 
that by total effects, the proportion of donating money and time goes up by 
approximately 4.2 percent and 1.5 percent in religious sector, and 5.1 percent and 
1.7 percent in non-religious sectors. However, this result does not mean donation of 
money and time are complements. Breaking up the total effect of time into 
substitution and non-substitution effects, the change of religious sector is mainly 
from non-substitution effects. This, again, supports that there’s no relationship 
between money and time in religious sector. Thus, while people are influenced by 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations when deciding whether donating money or time 
for secular organizations, when deciding charitable activities for religious 




















Figure 3: The Change of Proportion of Outcomes after Discounting 
Price by 10%: Gross Donation of Money and Time 
   Panel A: Total effect 
 





Many papers have focused only on monetary charitable giving without 
analyzing volunteer activities although volunteering is popular, comprises a huge 
part of the total value of charitable gifts, and is expected to have somewhat 
relationship with donation. Because of ignoring volunteering, their study under or 
over-stated tax policy on altruistic behaviors. Brown and Lankford (1992) found 

























activities, but their results have been different. Feldman (2010) borrowed a nice 
approach from DiNardo and Lemieux (1992, 2001) to find it, and concluded that 
they are substitutes. However, she also pointed out that there is no reason to think 
that their relationship have to remain same across different purposes. This was a 
point that Segal and Weisbrod (2002) argued as well.  
With this motivation, this paper analyzes the relationships for religious 
organizations and for non-religious, secular organizations, using PSID data. By 
using PSID data, this paper can use more recent data and calculate tax price, 
income after taxation more precisely than Feldman (2010). Also, PSID data has 
individuals’ answers about which organizations they volunteered and donated for 
2010. The result is that in aggregate analysis of two behaviors, they are substitutes, 
which confirms same result with Feldman (2010). However, in disaggregate 
analysis, while finding substitutionary relationship in secular sector, which is 
similar with the level of the aggregate, this paper finds neither substitutionary nor 
complementary relationship between two behaviors in religious sector. With this 
finding, we can say that people do not substitute their hours for money by extrinsic 
factors in religious sectors. Time is not Money between religious charitable 
activities. To make this finding visible, this paper shows the result of simulation: If 
the government discount tax price by 10 percent, what happens in four outcomes in 
the aggregated and disaggregated level? As expected, the substitutionary effect is 
very small for religious giving, while there is the significant effect in non-religious 
giving.  
Obviously, this paper has some limit points, and one of them is that this paper 
finds out the relationship between money and time donation within but not between 
organizations. For example, those who donate money for religious organization 
might be more likely to donate for non-religious organizations. Brown et al. (2009) 
handled similar issue: Regardless of organizations, those had donated money 
donated more for victims of Tsunami in 2004, and those had donated for the 
victims donated less in 2005. This implies that there is complementary or 
substitutionary relationship between organizations. This issue is left for future 
research.   
Another limit point is that this research is based on bivariate probit model and 
modified version. As individual decides to donate and volunteer for each 
organization, error terms across organizations are more likely to be correlated, 
which means that multivariate probit and modified multivariate model are more 
accurate for disaggregated analysis. However, multivariate probit model has many 
obstacles to be used. (Greene, 2002) So, by this time, bivariate probit model is the 
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best option for this analysis.  
There is another issue rather than tax policy: Government direct subsidies to 
charities and gifts of others, which might crowd out individual’s gifts. According to 
the Duncan (1999) and Bergstrom et al. (1986), these are likely to crowd out 
individual’s gift if they are motivated by total supply of public good. This issue 
was researched by Duncan (1999) in aggregated level, but like the effect of tax 
policies on monetary donation, there might be different effects of these across types 
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A) Frisch complements and substitutes in this model 
 
Note that when donation of time and money are substitutes, there exist 
people who donate both money and time only if 𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖 − 𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
2 > 0. Since in the 
data, a large number of respondents are a time-and-money donator (Outcome 4). 
Thus, 𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖 − 𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
2 > 0. 
Note that by addictive form of utility function, the Frisch demand of 𝑐𝑖 
and 𝑣𝑖  are 𝑓(∅𝑖, 𝑝𝑐 , 𝑝𝑐 , 𝜆𝑐 , 𝜆𝑣)  and 𝑔(∅𝑖, 𝑝𝑐 , 𝑝𝑐 , 𝜆𝑐 , 𝜆𝑣) , respectively. When 








𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖(𝑟𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣) − 𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖(𝑟𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐)
𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖 − 𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖
2







By the condition of Outcome 4, 𝑟𝑐𝑣𝑖(𝑟𝑣𝑖 − 𝜆𝑣𝑝𝑣) − 𝑟𝑣𝑣𝑖(𝑟𝑐𝑖 − 𝜆𝑐𝑝𝑐) > 0  and 










> 0, 𝑐𝑖  and 𝑣𝑖  are Frisch substitutes and if 
𝜕𝑣𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑐
< 0 , they are Frisch 





B) An example of TAXSIM program 
 
Here is a sample entry for a single tax-payer with one child in Michigan. 
(Labor income: $50,000, Property tax: $3,000, Other income: $4,000 Childcare 
expanse: $4,000 Short-term capital gain: -$1,000, Mortgage interest paid, 
charitable giving, etc.: $0) Then TAXSIM program will give 
To interpret the above, his tax liability for 2010 is $2,397.5 for federal tax, $1042.2 
for state tax, and $7,650 for Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) tax.  His 
marginal tax rate for additional $1 income is 0.15, 0.0645, 0.153 respectively. What 






Table A1. Change of taxes by increasing inputs by $1,000. 
 
+$1,000 Federal tax State tax Federal tax 
rate 
State tax rate 
Income +$150 +$64.5 0 0 
































Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont 
Region 2 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin 
Region 3 
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, 
Washington DC, West Virginia 
Region 4 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, Wyoming, Alaska, Hawaii 
 










Money    
Taxprice -1.664*** -1.683*** -1.670*** 
 (0.203) (0.202) (0.202) 
Income($0000) 0.0691*** 0.0659*** 0.0676*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0144) 
Income_sq -0.000543*** -0.000513*** -0.000540*** 
 (0.000113) (0.000118) (0.000111) 
Age(10) 0.324*** 0.322*** 0.393*** 
 (0.0903) (0.0910) (0.0904) 
Age_sq -0.0157 -0.0153 -0.0218** 
 (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0103) 
Children -0.0913** -0.0956** -0.0662 
 (0.0442) (0.0442) (0.0405) 
Child in college 0.0336 0.0446 0.0266 
 (0.0435) (0.0439) (0.0395) 
Married 0.271*** 0.266*** 0.0920 
 (0.0578) (0.0584) (0.0630) 
Religious 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.243*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0183) 
College grad. 0.300*** 0.296*** 0.358*** 
 (0.0755) (0.0767) (0.0827) 
Max. educ 0.236*** 0.240*** 0.246*** 
 (0.0742) (0.0753) (0.0778) 
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Homeowner 0.254*** 0.255*** 0.240*** 
 (0.0524) (0.0514) (0.0528) 
Parent educ. 0.0500*** 0.0504*** 0.0647*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0152) (0.0133) 
Employed -0.132* -0.128 -0.157** 
 (0.0787) (0.0790) (0.0760) 
Minority -0.233*** -0.237*** -0.249*** 
 (0.0461) (0.0466) (0.0459) 
Hispanic -0.101 -0.0928 -0.100* 
 (0.0659) (0.0657) (0.0590) 
Male -0.456*** -0.456*** -1.982*** 
 (0.0766) (0.0763) (0.419) 
Dum_region2 -0.187** -0.185** -0.174* 
 (0.0902) (0.0931) (0.0904) 
Dum_region3 -0.160** -0.152** -0.165** 
 (0.0696) (0.0728) (0.0718) 
Dum_region4 -0.0273 -0.0236 -0.00184 
 (0.0773) (0.0796) (0.0792) 
Constant -1.487*** -1.490*** -0.0303 
 (0.207) (0.209) (0.482) 
Log-likelihood 
Time 
-1982.6479   
Taxprice -0.429*** -0.442*** -1.022*** 
 (0.138) (0.138) (0.337) 
Income($0000) 0.0148* 0.0152* 0.0414*** 
 (0.00886) (0.00906) (0.0154) 
Income_sq -0.000196** -0.000201** -0.000381*** 
 (9.20e-05) (9.39e-05) (0.000124) 
Age(10) 0.434*** 0.437*** 0.437*** 
 (0.0703) (0.0709) (0.0648) 
Age_sq -0.0375*** -0.0374*** -0.0321*** 
 (0.00681) (0.00686) (0.00680) 
Children 0.0891** 0.0862* 0.0433 
 (0.0443) (0.0448) (0.0498) 
Child in college -0.00598 -0.00333 0.00953 
 (0.0465) (0.0471) (0.0431) 
Married -0.732*** -0.741*** -0.568*** 
 (0.0820) (0.0815) (0.130) 
Religious 0.227*** 0.227*** 0.266*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0163) 
College grad. 0.334*** 0.332*** 0.379*** 
 (0.0689) (0.0701) (0.0756) 
Max. educ 0.159** 0.157* 0.219*** 
 (0.0798) (0.0809) (0.0748) 
Homeowner 0.0212 0.0192 0.117** 
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 (0.0550) (0.0550) (0.0519) 
Parent educ. 0.0825*** 0.0823*** 0.0881*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0129) 
Employed -0.125*** -0.120*** -0.170*** 
 (0.0381) (0.0393) (0.0542) 
Minority -0.157*** -0.156*** -0.206*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0438) (0.0502) 
Hispanic -0.0407 -0.0445 -0.0603 
 (0.0612) (0.0610) (0.0537) 
Male -3.232*** -3.154*** -3.211*** 
 (0.307) (0.307) (0.283) 
Dum_region2 0.0285 0.0223 -0.0596 
 (0.0878) (0.0892) (0.0905) 
Dum_region3 -0.0386 -0.0368 -0.126* 
 (0.0668) (0.0669) (0.0686) 
Dum_region4 0.137** 0.129** 0.0844 
 (0.0597) (0.0604) (0.0666) 

































Observations 4,421 4,421 4,421 
 










Money    
Taxprice -0.996*** -0.995*** -1.018*** 
 (0.199) (0.193) (0.192) 
Income($0000) 0.00541 0.00593 0.00579 
 (0.00951) (0.00986) (0.00967) 
Income_sq 0.000115 0.000120 0.000118 
 (0.000147) (0.000163) (0.000156) 
Age(10) 0.356*** 0.350*** 0.369*** 
 (0.0954) (0.0951) (0.0920) 
Age_sq -0.0176* -0.0173* -0.0194** 
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 (0.00991) (0.00986) (0.00956) 
Children -0.0478 -0.0466 -0.0492 
 (0.0497) (0.0484) (0.0466) 
Child in college 0.0705 0.0737 0.0757* 
 (0.0463) (0.0455) (0.0423) 
Married 0.317*** 0.306*** 0.269*** 
 (0.0673) (0.0689) (0.0731) 
Religious 0.514*** 0.513*** 0.532*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0211) (0.0251) 
College grad. 0.0600 0.0545 0.0617 
 (0.0771) (0.0779) (0.0776) 
Max. educ 0.288*** 0.290*** 0.281*** 
 (0.0785) (0.0784) (0.0830) 
Homeowner 0.241*** 0.248*** 0.235*** 
 (0.0598) (0.0595) (0.0546) 
Parent educ. 0.0193 0.0194 0.0218* 
 (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0122) 
Employed -0.0480 -0.0471 -0.0618 
 (0.0685) (0.0681) (0.0672) 
Minority -0.109 -0.115 -0.0981 
 (0.0755) (0.0767) (0.0681) 
Hispanic -0.0376 -0.0363 -0.0431 
 (0.0813) (0.0807) (0.0776) 
Male -0.265*** -0.263*** -0.380*** 
 (0.0802) (0.0802) (0.0814) 
Dum_region2 0.0608 0.0660 0.0787 
 (0.0869) (0.0889) (0.0876) 
Dum_region3 0.0352 0.0421 0.0551 
 (0.0625) (0.0622) (0.0636) 
Dum_region4 -0.0235 -0.00945 0.00511 
 (0.0812) (0.0802) (0.0814) 
Constant -2.888*** -2.877*** -2.782*** 




-2048.0507   
Taxprice -0.823*** -0.761*** -0.795*** 
 (0.152) (0.154) (0.282) 
Income($0000) -0.00671 -0.00920 -0.00752 
 (0.0111) (0.0120) (0.0132) 
Income_sq -3.48e-06 2.89e-05 5.18e-05 
 (0.000140) (0.000143) (0.000147) 
Age(10) 0.416*** 0.400*** 0.385*** 
 (0.0921) (0.0942) (0.0859) 
Age_sq -0.0344*** -0.0324*** -0.0293*** 
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 (0.00978) (0.00990) (0.00966) 
Children -0.0370 -0.0227 -0.0179 
 (0.0604) (0.0597) (0.0624) 
Child in college 0.0761 0.0660 0.0628 
 (0.0617) (0.0634) (0.0696) 
Married -0.299*** -0.318*** -0.246 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.193) 
Religious 0.477*** 0.494*** 0.521*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0249) (0.0724) 
College grad. 0.117 0.116 0.108 
 (0.0977) (0.0986) (0.0942) 
Max. educ 0.112 0.0999 0.119 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.122) 
Homeowner 0.0412 0.0586 0.0944 
 (0.0661) (0.0647) (0.0856) 
Parent educ. 0.0467*** 0.0447*** 0.0418*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0136) (0.0125) 
Employed -0.110* -0.101* -0.104* 
 (0.0590) (0.0574) (0.0553) 
Minority 0.0337 0.0669 0.0644 
 (0.0552) (0.0543) (0.0875) 
Hispanic -0.0797 -0.0656 -0.0640 
 (0.110) (0.104) (0.0905) 
Male -0.682*** -0.652*** -0.622*** 
 (0.0968) (0.0952) (0.115) 
Dum_region2 0.232* 0.216* 0.203* 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.118) 
Dum_region3 0.222* 0.212* 0.185 
 (0.118) (0.121) (0.116) 
Dum_region4 0.215 0.190 0.155 





































Observations 4,421 4,421 4,421 












Money    
Taxprice -1.326*** -1.334*** -1.319*** 
 (0.145) (0.147) (0.137) 
Income($0000) 0.0687*** 0.0672*** 0.0676*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0113) 
Income_sq -0.000515*** -0.000502*** -0.000512*** 
 (9.14e-05) (9.19e-05) (8.84e-05) 
Age(10) 0.306*** 0.305*** 0.328*** 
 (0.0914) (0.0907) (0.0849) 
Age_sq -0.0147 -0.0146 -0.0176** 
 (0.00939) (0.00931) (0.00861) 
Children -0.0829** -0.0849** -0.0616 
 (0.0405) (0.0407) (0.0394) 
Child in college 0.0385 0.0428 0.0407 
 (0.0406) (0.0413) (0.0382) 
Married 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.0234 
 (0.0529) (0.0526) (0.0653) 
Religious 2.88e-05 0.000921 0.0169 
 (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0122) 
College grad. 0.257*** 0.261*** 0.318*** 
 (0.0571) (0.0576) (0.0638) 
Max. educ 0.236*** 0.233*** 0.232*** 
 (0.0636) (0.0640) (0.0657) 
Homeowner 0.154*** 0.156*** 0.134*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0413) (0.0393) 
Parent educ. 0.0518*** 0.0520*** 0.0612*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0111) 
Employed -0.142** -0.143** -0.172*** 
 (0.0637) (0.0631) (0.0630) 
Minority -0.226*** -0.228*** -0.241*** 
 (0.0583) (0.0584) (0.0573) 
Hispanic -0.125* -0.123* -0.119** 
 (0.0675) (0.0670) (0.0579) 
Male -0.525*** -0.523*** -1.008*** 
 (0.0659) (0.0656) (0.163) 
Dum_region2 -0.210** -0.210** -0.200** 
 (0.0890) (0.0886) (0.0896) 
Dum_region3 -0.183** -0.180** -0.190** 
 (0.0765) (0.0767) (0.0767) 
Dum_region4 -0.132 -0.136 -0.126 
 (0.0914) (0.0908) (0.0883) 
Constant -1.210*** -1.209*** -0.644* 






-2417.3356   
Taxprice -0.404*** -0.418*** -0.758*** 
 (0.122) (0.121) (0.208) 
Income($0000) 0.0160* 0.0163** 0.0365** 
 (0.00833) (0.00831) (0.0156) 
Income_sq -0.000179** -0.000182** -0.000314*** 
 (8.05e-05) (8.04e-05) (0.000118) 
Age(10) 0.253*** 0.255*** 0.284*** 
 (0.0738) (0.0747) (0.0668) 
Age_sq -0.0234*** -0.0236*** -0.0226*** 
 (0.00732) (0.00740) (0.00658) 
Children 0.0924*** 0.0960*** 0.0608 
 (0.0344) (0.0347) (0.0417) 
Child in college 0.0238 0.0202 0.0349 
 (0.0377) (0.0375) (0.0369) 
Married -0.609*** -0.617*** -0.536*** 
 (0.0692) (0.0688) (0.0880) 
Religious 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.0883*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0170) 
College grad. 0.360*** 0.357*** 0.380*** 
 (0.0571) (0.0577) (0.0589) 
Max. educ 0.102 0.105 0.149** 
 (0.0701) (0.0703) (0.0703) 
Homeowner -0.0368 -0.0346 0.00813 
 (0.0542) (0.0540) (0.0556) 
Parent educ. 0.0650*** 0.0657*** 0.0724*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0124) 
Employed -0.149*** -0.150*** -0.198*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0398) (0.0520) 
Minority -0.165*** -0.168*** -0.208*** 
 (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0520) 
Hispanic -0.0686 -0.0668 -0.0728 
 (0.0556) (0.0528) (0.0456) 
Male -1.365*** -1.358*** -1.404*** 
 (0.0878) (0.0877) (0.0928) 
Dum_region2 -0.00838 -0.0110 -0.0726 
 (0.0753) (0.0756) (0.0815) 
Dum_region3 -0.0572 -0.0603 -0.129* 
 (0.0680) (0.0686) (0.0748) 
Dum_region4 0.0346 0.0327 -0.0124 















































본 연구에서는 기부와 봉사활동에 대해서 종합적인(aggregate) 
측면에서와 자선 단체의 종류별 측면(Disaggregate)에서의 두 행동 
관계를 분석하였다. 2011년 PSID 데이터를 이용하여, Feldman(2010)의 
방법론을 통해 분석한 결과, 기부와 봉사활동은 서로 대체재인 것으로 
나타났다. 하지만, 이 두 행동을 자선 단체의 종류별로 나눠서 분석을 
하였을 때, 두 행동은 서로 다른 관계를 보였다. 즉, 비종교적인 자선 
단체에서는 사람들은 봉사활동을 대체하기 위해 기부를 하였지만, 
종교적인 자선단체에서는 두 행동이 서로 대체재, 보완재 관계가 
나타나지 않았다. 또한 본 연구에서는 기부의 가격효과가 상대가격 
효과가 아닌 직접적으로 봉사활동에 영향을 주는 것을 발견하였다. 이 
효과가 상대가격효과보다 컸기 때문에 이전 논문들에서는 이 두 행동을 
대체재가 아닌 보완재로 해석을 하였다.   
 
…………………………………… 
주요어 : 기부, 봉사활동, 대체재, 보완재, Disaggregated analysis. 
학 번 : 2014-20210 
 
